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2A- 12/30/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF JOHNSTOWN, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13222 
JOHNSTOWN POLICE BENEVOLENT^ASSOCIATION,. 
Respondent. 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH, P.C. (JAMES W. ROEMER, JR., 
and ELAYNE G. GOLD of counsel), for Charging Party 
CAPUTO, AULISI & SKODA, ESQS. (RICHARD T. AULISI of 
counsel), for Respondent 
MURRY F. SOLOMON and MATTHEW R. FLETCHER for Cayuga-
Onondaga Counties BOCES, Amicus Curiae 
WILLIAM HERRMANN III, ESQ., for City of New York, 
Amicus Curiae 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of counsel), 
for Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, Amicus Curiae 
ROBERT M. LAUGHLIN, for County of Chautauqua, 
Amicus Curiae 
PROSKAUER, ROSE, GOETZ & MENDELSOHN (M. DAVID ZURNDORFER 
of counsel), for Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 
New York City Transit Authority and Triborough Bridge 
and Tunnel Authority, Amici Curiae 
EDWIN L. CRAWFORD, for New York State Association of 
Counties, Amicus Curiae 
MARK PETTIT and ALFRED T. RICCIO, for New York State 
Management Advocates for School Labor Affairs, 
Amicus Curiae 
LOMBARDI, REINHARD, WALSH & HARRISON, P.C. (RICHARD P. 
WALSH, JR. and THOMAS J. JORDAN of counsel), for 
J New York State Professional Firefighters Association, 
Inc., Amicus Curiae 
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JOHN P. O'REILLY, ESQ., for New York State Public 
Employer Labor Relations Association, Amicus Curiae 
JAY WORONA, ESQ. (JOSEPH B. PORTER of counsel), for 
New York State School Boards Association, Inc., 
Amicus Curiae 
DREYER, BOYAJIAN & TUTTLE, for Police Conference of 
New York, Inc., Amicus Curiae 
ROBERT W. HOWARD, for Town of Colonie, Amicus Curiae 
SONNY HALL, for Transport Workers Union, Local 2 00, 
Amicus Curiae 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Johnstown (City) to a decision by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director). The City has 
charged that the Johnstown Police Benevolent Association (PBA) 
violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it refused to negotiate the City's demands to delete 
two provisions contained in the parties' expired 1990-91 contract 
from any successor to that contract. One provision concerns 
minimum staffing per shift; the other, health insurance for 
retirees. 
The Director dismissed the charge because the City's demands 
embraced nonmandatory subjects of negotiation about which the PBA 
was not required to bargain. 
Although the City concedes that its demands are nonmandatory 
according to their subject matter, it argues in its exceptions 
that the demands in "fairness, equity and logic" become or should 
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be treated as mandatory subjects of negotiation having been made 
a part of the parties7 contract, but only as and to the extent 
they are embodied in that agreement.-'' 
The PBA argues in response that there is no sound basis for 
theCity'!s_. "metamorphosis, theory11 of negotiability and that our 
existing precedents require dismissal of the charge. 
Amicus curiae briefs have been filed by a number of 
interested entities and organizations, including the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME; New York 
State Professional Firefighters Association, Inc., and the 
Transport Workers Union, Local 100, which support the City's 
position, and Cayuga-Onondaga BOCES; City of New York; County of 
Chautauqua; Metropolitan Transportation Authority; New York City 
Transit Authority; New York State Association of Counties; 
New York State Management Advocates for School Labor Affairs; 
New York State Public Employer Labor Relations Association; 
New York State School Boards Association, Inc.; Police Conference 
of New York, Inc. ; Town of Colonie; and the Triborough Bridge and 
Tunnel Authority, which support, on different grounds, the PBA's 
position. 
The Board has held consistently that the scope of 
negotiations, which categorizes subjects as mandatory, 
-''The City's arguments would not, for example, make mandatory the 
negotiation of a demand to expand the staffing provision. 
According to the City's arguments, demands to delete or to 
continue that provision would be mandatorily negotiable, as would 
proposals to decrease the specified staffing level. 
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nonmandatory (permissive), or prohibited, is unaffected by the 
parties7 bargaining regarding those subjects. The Board has held 
specifically on several occasions that neither a party's 
willingness to negotiate a nonmandatory subject nor its agreement 
to a nonmandatory subject transforms that subject into a 
mandatory subject of negotiation.-7 
The City argues, however, that the enactment of §209-a.l(e) 
of the Act necessitates a reexamination and reversal of this line 
of cases. Section 209-a.l(e) of the Act makes it an improper 
practice for a public employer to refuse to continue all terms of 
an expired agreement until a new agreement is negotiated. Under 
existing precedent, neither a legislative imposition nor an 
interest arbitration award is a negotiated "agreement" for 
purposes of §209-a.l(e). Thus, it has been held that neither a 
legislative body-7 nor an interest arbitration panel-7 may make 
any changes in the terms of a union's expired contract without 
the union's consent. Therefore, the City not unreasonably 
assumes that §209-a.l(e) will be interpreted to require it to 
continue the nonmandatory subjects in its expired agreement with 
-''See, e.g. , Troy Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, 10 PERB 53 015 
(1977); State of New York. 6 PERB 53005 (1973); Bd. of Educ. of 
the City of New York, 5 PERB 53054 (1972). 
-''Niagara County Legislature and County of Niagara, 16 PERB 53 071 
(1983), conf'd, 104 A.D.2d 1, 17 PERB 57021 (4th Dep't 1971), 
which discusses the legislative history in some detail. 
-''City of Kingston, 18 PERB 53036 (1985) , which again discusses 
the relevant legislative history. 
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the PBA even after the issuance of an interest arbitration award 
unless the PBA permits the nonmandatory subjects to proceed to 
compulsory interest arbitration.-7 The City contends that so 
long as the nonmandatory contract terms remain nonmandatory 
subjects of bargaining, the union can both refuse to bargain 
those terms and avoid arbitration of them by filing a scope of 
negotiation improper practice charge.-7 If the City's 
interpretation of §209-a.l(e) is correct, the PBA, and other 
similarly situated unions, can assure the continuation of all 
nonmandatory terms in an expired agreement simply by always 
proceeding to interest arbitration in each negotiating cycle. 
That result, argues the City, is contrary to the policy of the 
Act because it undermines collective bargaining and affords the 
union a virtual guarantee that nonmandatory contract terms will 
continue in effect, at the union's sole option, if not in 
perpetuity, then at least for so long as the statutory impasse 
procedures for police end with compulsory interest arbitration. 
The Board considered the effect of §209-a.l(e) on the scope 
of negotiations in Peekskill City School District.-7 The Board 
-
7We have not to date been presented with a case in which it was 
necessary to decide the employer's obligations in relevant 
context. We have previously declined to speculate about an 
employer's obligations or a union's rights under §209-a.l(e) of 
the Act. See, e.g., Village of Mamaroneck Police Benevolent 
Ass'n. 22 PERB [^3029 (1989) . 
-
7A party may not pursue over objection a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation in fact-finding or compulsory interest arbitration. 
z/16 PERB f3075 (1983). 
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there held that §209-a.l(e) of the Act does not affect the 
negotiability of a demand. Under Peekskillr nonmandatory 
subjects contained in an expired agreement are not converted into 
mandatory subjects of negotiation by virtue of their 
incorporation into that agreement despite the existence of §209-
a.l(e). 
The question we must address in this case is whether there 
are sufficient reasons to reverse these several decisions. We 
have deliberated on this question with great care because of its 
importance to the process of collective bargaining and to the 
statutory impasse resolution procedures. We conclude that we 
should not adopt the test for negotiability sought by the City in 
this context-'' at this time. Readers should understand, 
however, the reluctance with which we reach this conclusion and 
pay particular attention to the several observations and cautions 
we articulate which have been occasioned by the enactment of 
§209-a.l(e), its administrative and judicial interpretations and 
the lack of legislative action on the problems raised by the 
City. 
Our jurisprudence for many years has recognized a 
distinction between mandatory and nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation. Those categories were developed from a recognition 
-'Certain of the amicus participants have argued that we may 
effect this type of change only by rule-making. Our disposition 
of this charge makes it unnecessary for us to entertain that 
argument, but we will take it under advisement at such later date 
as may be appropriate. 
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that those subjects which primarily affect an employer's mission 
should not have to be bargained.-7 The parties within our 
jurisdiction have fashioned their bargaining relationships over 
the years around the principle that negotiability is determined 
by the subject nature ofthe demand, not_ what the bargaining 
history of that demand may have been in any given bargaining 
relationship. Were we to adopt the City's position in this case, 
we would surely distort, after the fact, the collective 
bargaining relationships and the exchanges of promises which may 
have been made in reliance upon well-established principles of 
negotiability without affording the parties subject to a 
N
 bargaining duty an opportunity to reshape their relationships and 
promises. 
We are also concerned that the fundamental change in 
negotiability analysis which the City seeks from us would chill 
the parties' willingness to bargain nonmandatory subjects. 
Although the Board has not required bargaining about nonmandatory 
subjects, it has always encouraged parties to do so.—7 Under 
our existing case law, a party may negotiate or agree to a 
nonmandatory subject with the certain knowledge that its actions 
will not cause it to incur any future bargaining obligation 
regarding that subject. Some have argued that making all 
-
7See, e.g. , City School Dist. of the City of New Rochelle, 
4 PERB 53060 (1971). 
l^ 7Id. 
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contract terms mandatorily negotiable may actually foster the 
parties' willingness to negotiate nonmandatory subjects. We are 
persuaded, however, that in most cases the opposite result would 
be occasioned, despite the parties' ability to control the 
duration of the nonmandatory subject by the use of specific 
sunset language in the contract. 
The genesis of the City's argument affords us yet another 
reason to reaffirm our existing precedents at this time. As 
noted, the City's entire rationale for a change in negotiability 
analysis hinges on an interpretation of §209-a.l(e) of the Act 
which has not yet been made or tested in any forum. If the City 
is incorrect in its assumption that §209-a.l(e) guarantees 
continuation of expired contract terms in perpetuity, then there 
is no reason for making the requested change in negotiability. 
We cannot now say with certainty that a union which refuses an 
employer's demand to bargain regarding the deletion or 
continuation of a nonmandatory contract term is necessarily 
entitled to a continuation of that term in perpetuity under all 
circumstances. Indeed, some amicus participants oppose the 
City's position on the theory that nonmandatory terms of expired 
agreements can be discontinued after the issuance of a 
legislative determination or an interest arbitration award. 
Furthermore, it is possible that a union which refuses to bargain 
a nonmandatory contract term may jeopardize its entitlements 
under §209-a.l(e) of the Act, just as an employer which refuses 
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to bargain the term at the union's demand may jeopardize any 
argument it may have regarding a right to discontinue the 
nonmandatory term of an expired agreement after exhaustion of the 
applicable impasse procedures. We make these observations so 
that.negotiating partiesi are aware.. that jthere_are yanp_us_risks.. _.. 
and costs associated with any given bargaining position and to 
encourage, once again, bargaining over all lawful subjects which 
affect the employment relationship, regardless of the category of 
negotiability into which they may fall. 
We are aware that the result reached in this case is not 
finally dispositive of the concerns which have prompted the 
City's charge. The Legislature's enactment of a statutory 
provision which guarantees the continuation of all nonmandatory 
contract terms without statutory provisions mandating the 
negotiation of those terms, at least to the extent of proposals 
to delete or continue them, has, perhaps unintentionally, 
complicated the bargaining process.—/ We also believe that to 
afford any union a perpetual continuation of the nonmandatory 
terms in an expired agreement, despite its refusal to bargain 
those terms in the context of negotiations for a successor 
—'For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Moses, Scope of 
Bargaining Under the Taylor Law: New York's Unique Situation 
(May 1992). The author's paper was presented at a conference 
commemorating the 25th Anniversary of the Act and is scheduled 
for publication in 56 Albany Law Review 53 under the title of 
Scope of Bargaining and the Triborough Law: New York's 
Collective Bargaining Dilemma. 
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contract, is to fundamentally undermine both the process of 
collective bargaining and the Act's impasse procedures. We do 
not believe, however, that the answer to these bargaining 
problems lies with us, through the adjudicatory process at this 
time. ............ ..... 
There have been several legislative proposals addressing 
various aspects of the concerns raised by the City in this 
case.—7 None of these proposals has yet been enacted. As made 
manifest in this case, there are fundamentally different points 
of view regarding the appropriate scope of collective bargaining 
given the existence of §209-a.l(e) of the Act. Whether, as a 
matter of public policy, the scope of bargaining should be 
expanded to include some or all of the terms of an expired 
agreement, and, if so, which ones, to what extent, and under what 
circumstances, are choices which are appropriately made by the 
Legislature. By declining the City's invitation to reverse our 
existing case law in this area, we give the Legislature an 
opportunity to consider the issues, to become more acquainted 
with the problems and to fashion a legislative solution. We do 
not believe at this time that we should effect by decision the 
changes sought by the City in our long-standing approach to 
^S.8349 (1990); S.4856 (1991); S.7655 (1991); A.8123 (1991); 
A.10562 (1991); A.11578 (1991). 
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negotiability determinations. Future developments, however, may 
warrant or necessitate a reevaluation of our current view. 
For the reasons set forth above, the City's exceptions are 
denied and the Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
M,:.1U^4 
PauLine R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe^r 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 




NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, DIVISION 726, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12579 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
GLADSTEIN, REIF & MEGINNISS (WALTER M. MEGINNISS, JR. and 
ELLEN DICHNER of counsel), for Charging Party 
ALBERT C. COSENZA, ESQ. (JOYCE RACHEL ELLMAN of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by Amalgamated 
Transit Union, Division 1056, AFL-CIO (ATU 1056) and Amalgamated 
Transit Union, Division 726, AFL-CIO (ATU 726) (collectively ATU) 
to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT). ATU 726, 
which represents the operating and maintenance employees in the 
Authority's Staten Island bus division, and ATU 1056, which 
represents employees in those titles in Queens, each allege that 
CASE NO. U-12578 
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the New York City Transit Authority (Authority) violated §2 09-
a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally ceased giving paid release time to representatives of 
ATU's two units to participate in the Employee Recognition Program 
(ERP). The charges were consolidated and, after hearing, the ALJ 
dismissed both. 
The ALJ dismissed the charge filed by ATU Local 1056 for lack 
of jurisdiction under §205.5 (d) of the Act.^ The ALJ held in 
this respect that the contract, which expired by its terms on 
April 30, 1991, was continued in effect by operation of law under 
the Court of Appeals7 decision in Association of Surrogates and 
Supreme Court Reporters within the City of New York v. State of 
New York-7 (hereafter Surrogates). The ALJ then concluded that 
as the source of any ERP release time right was ATU 1056's 
contract with the Authority, the charge was beyond our 
j urisdiction. 
The ALJ reached the merits of ATU 726's charge, however, 
because he found that it did not have contractual release time 
-
7That section of the Act denies us jurisdiction over the 
enforcement or alleged violation of agreements which does not 
otherwise constitute an improper practice. 
2/79 N.Y.2d 39, 25 PERB ^7502 (1992). In that case, the Court 
held that §209-a.l(e) of the Act continued the parties7 contract 
in effect, thereby affording the plaintiff unions protection 
against impairment of that contract under the Federal 
Constitution. 
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provisions. The ALJ dismissed this charge-'' because he viewed 
the employees' participation in the ERP to be a work assignment, 
which the Authority could change unilaterally in an exercise of 
its dual managerial prerogatives to determine its staffing needs 
and to deploy staff in response to budget reductions. 
ATU 1056 excepts to the ALJ's jurisdictional dismissal and 
joins with ATU 726 in excepting to the ALJ's merits dismissal. 
The Authority argues in response that the ALJ's decision is 
correct in both respects and must be affirmed. 
For the following reasons, we reverse the ALJ's 
jurisdictional dismissal, but affirm his decision dismissing the 
charges on their merits. 
The ERP recognizes Authority employees for longevity and 
meritorious service by awarding them testimonials of various types 
and values. The record does not show how the ERP was actually 
established. As the ALJ noted, however, we know that the ERP 
evolved from and is the successor to the Depot Assistance Team 
(DAT), which had existed from 1984 until the ERP was established 
in May 1987. DAT was a joint labor-management program consisting 
of a number of projects designed to improve the quality of work-
life in the surface division of the Authority. One of DAT's 
projects, involving an incentive program for bus operators and 
maintenance employees, evolved into the ERP, which exists now as a 
-''Had the ALJ not dismissed ATU 1056's charge for lack of 
jurisdiction, he would have dismissed it on the merits for the 
same reasons he dismissed ATU 726's charge. 
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unit within the Authority's labor relations department. The ERP 
is funded entirely by the Authority and consists of 
representatives of various unions which represent Authority 
employees, including the ATU, and Authority management. ATU 
1056's ERP representative is Roger Scales, a bus operator for the 
Authority. ATU 726's ERP representative is Michael Maloney, also 
a bus operator. Union ERP participants are selected by their 
union presidents. According to James Bromfield, the Director of 
ERP, and its only management representative at present, the 
selections are approved by the Authority, although ATU argues that 
it only need give notice of its selection to the Authority. It is 
undisputed, however, that Bromfield directs all of the assignments 
of ERP participants who have scheduled working hours. 
As a result of budget reductions mandated by the Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority, the Authority, in addition to certain 
other personnel actions affecting the ERP, eliminated one of ATU's 
positions on the ERP. Instead of ATU 1056 and ATU 726 each having 
a full-time ERP participant, each participant is now assigned 
half-time to the ERP. When not assigned to the ERP, Scales and 
Maloney are reassigned to their duties as bus operators for the 
Authority. In dismissing ATU 1056's charge for lack of 
jurisdiction, the ALJ concluded that any right to release time for 
ERP participation stemmed from contractual release time 
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provisions-' and a provision concerning pay for participation in 
the ERP.-7 ATU 1056's exception to the ALT's jurisdictional 
determination reflects certain misunderstandings regarding our 
interpretation of the jurisdictional limitation in §205.5(d) of 
the Act. Even though we agree ultimately with ATU's conclusion 
regarding our jurisdiction, these deserve mention and correction 
for the further guidance of all parties. 
It is not dispositive of the jurisdictional question that ATU 
1056 has not alleged specifically in its charge that the 
Authority's action violated its contract. Similarly, its 
-''Section 1.14 of the contract between the Authority and ATU 1056 
provides as follows: 
A. Joint Labor-Management Activities: Employees 
who are duly designated by the Union to act 
on matters relating to the interests of 
employees represented by such organization 
shall be permitted to engage in the following 
activities, subject to the conditions set 
forth herein and upon advance approval by the 
Authority, without loss of pay or other 
employee benefits, except as otherwise 
provided in subsection C, paragraph 6: 
1) ... 
2) ... 
3) To participate in meetings of joint 
departmental labor-management committees .... 
-''That section provides as follows: 
All employees assigned to the Employee 
Recognition Program will be compensated at 
their regular rate, plus twenty-five percent 
(25%) only for work performed on the Program. 
This additional payment is provided to fully 
compensate members for all other expenses 
incurred as a result of the nature of the 
Program activities. 
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allegation that the Authority unilaterally changed a 
noncontractual past practice is not conclusive of our jurisdiction 
nor does it end our jurisdictional inquiry. As the ALT correctly 
observed, we are without jurisdiction whenever the contract is the 
source of right to the charging party with respect to the subject 
matter of its improper practice charge.-7 There being no 
contract grievance filed, and, therefore, no opportunity to have 
the issue of contractual coverage decided by a third party, it is 
our responsibility to determine whether the charge is within our 
power to entertain. 
Both of these charges allege that ATU's unit employees have a 
right to full-time assignment to the ERP. Having reviewed 
ATU 1056's contract, the record, and the parties' arguments, we do 
not agree that the contract arguably gives any unit employee an 
entitlement to an ERP assignment of any duration.-7 The one 
contract section pertaining specifically to the ERP concerns only 
a wage rate. The specification of a contractual rate of pay 
cannot reasonably be read as a right to participate in the ERP. 
As to the provisions in the contract covering release time for 
joint labor-management activities, the Authority and ATU agree 
-'See, e.cf. . County of Nassau. 23 PERB U[3051 (1990) . 
-
7The ALJ found that ATU 726 did not have release time provisions 
in its contract with the Authority. In its exceptions, ATU notes 
that ATU 726's contract with the Authority is the same as ATU 
1056's in relevant part. In view of our disposition of the 
jurisdictional question, we need not reach this question of fact. 
We would have jurisdiction over ATU 72 6's charge even if the 
facts were as they are alleged by ATU. 
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that it does not cover the ERP program. Nor do we read the 
references in the charge to release time as either an allegation 
or an admission by ATU 1056 that its contract in any way covers 
the subject of its charge. As we read the charge as filed, and as 
it was developed during the course of its processing, ATU 1056 
merely characterized the employees' participation in the ERP as 
release time to elucidate its argument that the Authority was 
under a duty to bargain any changes in the extent of that 
participation. 
Having determined that ATU 1056's contract with the Authority 
does not divest us of jurisdiction, we do not decide whether the 
alleged violation of the Act occurred during the stated term of 
the parties' contract or, if after the stated term of the 
contract, whether Surrogates extends the contract for purposes of 
affecting our jurisdiction under §205.5(d) of the Act. 
ATU's arguments on the merits are centered on the fact that 
its participants in the ERP were "released" fully from their 
duties as bus operators and paid to participate in the ERP. From 
this release from bus duties, ATU concludes that its ERP 
participants may not be reassigned to those duties for any amount 
of time unless the Authority first bargains that decision to 
change their assignment. The issue, however, is not whether the 
employees were released from their normal assignments to work in 
the ERP. As the ERP is structured, union participation in that 
program necessitated a release of the employees from their regular 
job duties. The issue, as the ALJ correctly recognized, is 
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whether the participation in the ERP is in the nature of a job 
assignment. If it is, the Authority was plainly entitled to 
reassign the employees to duties consistent with those for which 
they were hired.-7 
With respect to the controlling issue, we agree that although 
the ERP itself is a joint labor-management program, employee 
participation in that program is a job assignment. Other than the 
several unions7 selection of their ERP representative, all other 
factors point to ERP participation being a job assignment. The 
only contract language on the ERP specifically refers to employees 
as being "assigned" to that program. Authority management directs 
the assignment of ERP personnel to and at the various award 
ceremonies within fixed work hours. The work of the ERP 
transcends bargaining unit lines, covering almost all Authority 
personnel, including managerial and other unrepresented 
employees.-7 ATU's representatives on the ERP, for example, do 
not function for or on behalf of ATU unit personnel exclusively. 
Therefore, any analogy to ERP participation as release time from 
work for the pursuit of union business is not persuasive. Our 
conclusion in that respect is buttressed, and perhaps compelled, 
by the parties' mutual recognition that the contractual release 
-
7The nonconsensual assignment of employees to the ERP might give 
rise to a viable charge, but not a reassignment from the ERP to a 
position to which the employees were hired. Neither ATU 1056 nor 
ATU 726, of course, challenged the reassignment of Scales or 
Maloney to the ERP from their bus operator duties. 
-
7It appears that only the Authority's police are not covered by 
the ERP. 
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time provisions covering joint labor-management activities do not 
apply to ERP participation. As noted, the ATU's argument is 
centered on the employees' release from their bus driving duties. 
Were it to argue that the ERP's status as a joint labor-management 
program prevented the Authority from reassigning Scales and 
Maloney, we might be constrained to affirm the ALJ's dismissal for 
lack of jurisdiction based upon the contract language covering 
that issue. 
That the reassignment of Scales and Maloney to their bus 
operator duties may have reduced their pay is not relevant to the 
Authority's duty to bargain that reassignment. The twenty-five 
percent extra pay given ERP participants is to cover expenses 
while working in the ERP. It is plainly a payment conditioned 
upon service on the ERP, which is properly discontinued when 
service on the ERP is properly discontinued. 
The statutory issue, therefore, is and remains only whether 
the Authority could unilaterally reassign employees from the ERP. 
Having concluded that ERP participation is a job assignment, we 
find that the Authority was entitled to fix unilaterally its 
staffing needs for that program in response to budgetary cuts and 
to redeploy its staff within that program and to positions for 
which the employee participants were hired. 
Our several decisions relied upon by ATU in which we have 
held paid release time from work to be mandatorily negotiable—7 
^Local 2561, AFSCME. 23 PERB [^3054 (1990) ; Local 3 43, IAFF, 17 
PERB ^3121 (1984). 
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are simply inapposite given our finding that employees' 
participation in the ERP is a job assignment. Neither Scales nor 
Maloney was ever released from work. Rather, they were released 
from one set of job duties to permit them to assume another and 
were then reassigned, part-time, to the duties for which they were 
hired. 
In the context of this case, the Authority's decisions to 
reduce ERP staffing and to reassign Scales and Maloney from the 
ERP to the positions in which they were hired were not subject to 
any decisional bargaining obligation. 
For the reasons set forth above, such of the exceptions as 
apply to the ALJ's jurisdictional determination in U-12578 are 
granted and the ALJ's decision in that respect in that case is 
reversed. In all other respects, the exceptions are denied and 
the ALJ's decision dismissing both charges is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charges must be, and 
hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: December 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
2C-12/30/92 
") STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CLARKSTOWN ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
and CASE --NO-,—U—1-2-869 
CLARKSTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
BEVERLY R. HACKETT, ESQ., for Charging Party 
LEXOW, BERBIT & JASON (BETH L. FINKELSTEIN of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Clarkstown 
Administrators Association (Association) to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director). After a hearing, the Director dismissed the 
Association's charge against the Clarkstown Central School 
District (District) which alleges that the District violated 
§209-a.l(e) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it failed to pay salary increases required by section 1 of 
Article XI of the parties' expired contract. The Director 
concluded from an examination of the language and history of 
Article XI and the District's salary payment history that the 
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salary increases were payable only during the three years covered 
by the parties' 1988-91 contract, which expired on June 30, 1991. 
The Association argues that the contract language itself 
plainly extends the District's salary payment obligation beyond 
the contract term such that the Director erred by resorting to 
negotiating history in his interpretation of Article XI. It 
argues that the Director also erred by crediting the testimony of 
Jay F. Jason, the District's attorney and chief negotiator for 
the 1988-91 contract. 
The District argues in its response that the Director's 
resort to negotiating history as an aid to the interpretation of 
Article XI, even though unnecessary in view of the alleged 
clarity of Article XI, was permissible and that his reliance upon 
Jason's testimony was correct. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the Director's decision. 
Article XI of the parties' 1988-91 contract has four 
sections, only three of which are relevant to the present 
discussion.-1 Section 1 states that "in each year" unit 
employees will receive a salary increase of $2,500 and an 
additional $2,000 or $3,750 depending upon the employee's 
individual merit rating. Section 2 fixes a minimum and maximum 
salary range for the three years of the contract, which are 
specifically identified. Section 3, which begins with the phrase 
-'Section 4 covering tuition reimbursement is not in issue. 
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"during the term of this agreement", calculates the salary 
payment for an individual when the payment exceeds the maximum of 
the salary range. In that event, and to that extent, the 
increases are paid as a bonus and not added to base salary. 
The Association contends that the District is statutorily 
required to pay base and merit salary increases at the rate set 
forth in the 1988-91 contract during the 1991-92 school year and 
for each year thereafter until a new contract is reached. We do 
not agree. 
Initially, we find no basis to ascribe any error to the 
Director's consideration of the parties' negotiating history nor 
any reason to disturb his credibility findings regarding Jason's 
testimony. It is clear to us from the language of Article XI, 
the parties' negotiating history, the District's nonpayment of 
salary increases after expiration of the predecessor contract and 
the elimination in the 1988-91 contract of the longevity system 
in the predecessor contract,^ that the parties intended to 
allocate a specific sum of money for each year of the contract 
and to limit the salary provisions in the 1988-91 contract to its 
three stated years. 
The reference to "each year" in section 1 of Article XI is, 
as the Director held, most reasonably read to mean each of the 
three years of the agreement. To interpret that language as the 
-
;That agreement paid unit employees a $1,200 salary increase at 
the start of their 19th, 22nd and 25th year of credited service 
with the District. 
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Association would have us do would require that we discredit 
Jason's testimony, which we have no reason to do. Moreover, the 
Association's interpretation would give section 1 of Article XI a 
meaning different from that in sections 2 and 3 of the same 
Article. We believe that sections 1 through 3 of Article XI must 
be read together because they constitute the parties' basic 
salary plan. Sections 2 and 3 are specifically limited to the 
term of the contract and "each year" in section 1 is most 
reasonably given a similar meaning. 
For purposes of further clarity regarding these parties' 
intent to sunset the salary increases,-7 it is helpful to 
discuss separately the base pay and merit salary provisions of 
the parties' contract. 
For each year of the contract, which we have held was 
intended to tie the salary increases to the three-year duration 
of the contract, employees were to receive a $2,500 increase in 
salary irrespective of any other factor. We are unaware of any 
theory which would require the District under the expired terms 
of its contract to pay an additional $2,500 to unit employees 
every year after contract expiration until a new agreement is 
negotiated.-7 That would be equivalent to holding that an 
employer which has negotiated a 3%, 4% and 5% salary increase for 
the first, second and third years of a three-year agreement is 
-
7A sunset provision terminates or limits a contract term as of a 
certain date or upon a certain condition. 
^See Smithtown Cent. School Dist., 14 PERB f3072 (1981). 
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required to extend employees yet another 5% increase in salary 
after contract expiration. The parties7 contract regarding base 
salary included a scheduled increase in a specific dollar amount 
for the three years of the contract which need not be continued 
post-expiration. -1 
The additional salary payable:"according to anemployee's 
performance evaluation warrants further analysis. To this 
extent, the District has established a performance-based system 
of compensation. An employer's refusal to advance unit 
employees' salaries to a specified amount or within a specified 
range pursuant to a wage or salary system arguably violates its 
status quo obligation under the Act.-'' In this particular case, 
however, it is clear that the merit salary increases were 
specifically linked to the $2,500 guaranteed increases in base 
which are payable only for the three years of the contract. As 
we observed, the salary provisions in Article XI are most 
appropriately read as an integrated salary plan. We do not 
consider it a reasonable reading of this contract on the entirety 
of this record that the parties intended to have the merit salary 
increases continue beyond the stated duration of the contract 
when the $2,500 base salary increases were clearly intended to be 
paid only during the term of the contract. 
^See Hempstead Public School Dist. . 25 PERB [^3025 (1992). 
^See Cobleskill Cent. School Dist. , 16 PERB f3057 (1983) , 
petition to annul denied, 16 PERB 5(7023 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 
1983), aff'd, 105 A.D.2d 564, 17 PERB 57019 (3d Dep't 1984), 
motion for leave to appeal denied, 64 N.Y.2d 1071, 18 PERB j[7006 
(1985). 
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For the reasons set forth above, the Association's 
exceptions are denied and the Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
t 
2D- 12/30/92 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
") PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, SUFFOLK 
LOCAL 852, SMITHTOWN UNIT, 
Charging Party-, 
CASE NO. U-12829 
TOWN OF SMITHTOWN, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
JOHN B. ZOLLO, ESQ. (MECHEL M. BERTHOLET of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Town of Smithtown (Town) excepts to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Suffolk Local 852, Smithtown Unit (CSEA). CSEA's charge alleges 
that the Town unilaterally subcontracted exclusive unit work-7 
in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act). On a stipulated record, the ALJ found a 
violation of the Act as alleged, denying each of the Town's 
several defenses. 
-'The work involves the collection of white metal refuse such as 
refrigerators, washing machines and dishwashers. 
-and-
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In its exceptions, the Town argues only that it changed its 
level of service by requiring more frequent and faster 
collections of the subcontractor than of the CSEA unit employees. 
It equates this change in the level of service to a change in the 
tasks performed by the subcontractor which should occasion the 
application of a balancing test to determine a violation under 
our decision in Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority-7, 
which the ALT did not do. Under that balancing test, the Town 
argues that it should not be required to bargain the decision to 
subcontract what was admittedly exclusive unit work because unit 
employees were not personally affected by the subcontracting, 
which afforded Town residents better services. 
CSEA argues in response to the exceptions that the amendment 
to the Town Code relied upon by the Town should not be considered 
because that document, although referenced in the stipulation of 
facts, was not a part of it. Assuming we consider the Town Code, 
CSEA argues that it only evidences what is required of the 
subcontractor, not what the subcontractor is actually doing. 
Therefore, CSEA argues that there is no record evidence of either 
a change in the level of service or a dissimilarity in tasks as 
they are performed by the contractor. CSEA otherwise endorses 
the ALJ's decision. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision. 
l/
 18 PERB ^3083 (1985) 
^ 
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Turning first to CSEA's arguments regarding the Town Code, we 
may properly notice the Town's local laws^7 and find no prejudicial 
surprise to CSEA in our doing so because the Town Code was 
referenced in the parties' stipulation. Moreover, what is required 
of thesubcontractor under ther Town'sCoder is: prima fa^ cie evidence 
of its performance. We will not assume noncompliance with law and, 
therefore, place the burden of proof with respect to nonperformance 
on the party alleging it, in this case, CSEA. There being no proof 
that the subcontractor is not in compliance with the Town's Code, we 
will presume that it is performing according to the specifications 
of that local law. 
Turning to the Town's arguments, it basically contends that it 
need not bargain this subcontracting because collections are made by 
the private carter more often and faster than when unit employees 
did the work.-' We do not consider this argument to be persuasive. 
The tasks involved with white metal collection were unchanged on 
transfer to the subcontractor. Therefore, Niagara Frontier's 
balancing test is not triggered, even on the District's 
interpretation of that case.-7 The service improvements derived 
Estate Administrative Procedure Act, §306.4 (McKinney 1984). 
-''Unit employees collected the white metal refuse three or four 
times a year from April through October and during the winter on 
request, which was honored within approximately one week. The 
subcontractor collects 12 months a year and within 72 hours of a 
request for a collection. 
-
7The District's argument actually misconstrues Niagara Frontier. 
The balancing test mentioned in that case is invoked only when 
there has been a "significant change in the job qualifications." 
The job qualifications have not been changed on this record to 
any degree. 
,
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from the subcontracting also did not change the Town's basic 
mission.-' Although improved service is often a reason given by 
employers in justification of their unilateral subcontracting, it 
has not been considered a defense to a refusal to bargain 
allegation. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Town's exceptions are, 
denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Town: 
1. Cease and desist from unilaterally subcontracting the 
white metal refuse collection work of employees within the 
bargaining unit represented by CSEA. 
( ) 2. Restore all subcontracted white metal refuse collection 
work to CSEA unit employees. 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
ordinarily used to communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: December 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
-'See, e.g., City School Dist. of the City of New Rochelle, 
4 PERB ^3060 (1971). 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify
 t h e employees in the unit represented by Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Suffolk Local 852, Smithtown Unit (CSEA), that the Town of 
Smithtown: 
Will not unilaterally subcontract the white metal 
refuse collection work performed by employees 
within the bargaining unit represented by CSEA. 
Will restore all subcontracted white metal refuse 
collection work to CSEA unit employees. 
Town of Smithtown 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
• This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be alterec 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
2E-12/30/92 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNION-ENDICOTT MAINTENANCE WORKERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO.U-12 950 
UNION-ENDICOTT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
PETER D. BLOOD, for Charging Party 
C0U6HLIN & GERHART (FRANK W. MILLER of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Union-
Endicott Central School District (District) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT). After a hearing, the ALJ held 
that the District had violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) as alleged by the Union-
Endicott Maintenance Workers Association (Association) when it 
unilaterally changed the workweek of some of its custodians from 
Monday through Friday to Tuesday through Saturday.-7 
The District excepts to the entirety of the ALJ's decision 
and order. It argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting its notice 
of claim and waiver defenses and its arguments that the schedule 
-
7The ALJ dismissed the subparagraph (a) allegation for lack of 
proof and no exceptions have been taken to that aspect of his 
decision. 
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change was either not mandatorily negotiable or had been 
bargained. The District also argues that the remedial order is 
incorrect. 
The Association has responded to each of the District's 
several exceptions and argues that the AD's decision is correct 
on the facts and law and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision and order. 
The District first argues that the Association's failure to 
file a notice of claim pursuant to Education Law §3813 and 
General Municipal Law (GML) §50-e necessitates a dismissal of its 
charge. These statutes require a notice of claim to be filed 
with a school district within a certain time as a condition to 
the prosecution of an action or special proceeding against the 
school district. This defense is without merit for two reasons. 
First, the reference in these other statutes to an action or a 
special proceeding is to the two forms of judicial proceedings 
recognized by the State's Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR). 
An improper practice charge is not a judicial proceeding and the 
CPLR does not apply. Therefore, the notice of claim provisions 
of the Education Law and the GML have no application. Second, 
even assuming the notice of claim provisions were to apply to our 
proceedings, there is a recognized exception when there are 
procedures under other statutes which afford a school district 
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similar notice.-' The Act and the rules of procedure we have 
adopted relating to the filing, prosecution and defense of 
improper practice charges give a notice of claim to the District 
similar to that required by the other referenced statutes. 
Therefore, the purpose: of those statutes has"been satisfied. 
The District's contract waiver defenses are based upon a 
management rights clause and a clause defining the workweek. 
The management rights clause is general and does not address 
a right to change work schedules. As the ALT correctly 
recognized, we have held such general management rights clauses 
to be insufficient^ to establish the necessary clear and 
( ^ unmistakable waiver of the statutory right to bargain.-7 
The District argues, however, that the contract's 
definition of a workweek which begins "at 12:01 A.M. on Sunday" 
and ends on "Saturday at midnight" plainly gives it the right to 
schedule employees anytime during the stated week. As did the 
ALJ, we reject this interpretation of the contract, which we are 
necessarily empowered and required to make in conjunction with 
g/Grey v. Hudson Falls Cent. School Dist., 60 A.D.2d 361 (3d 
Dep't 1978) . 
-''See, e.g. . County of Rensselaer, 13 PERB 5(3080 (1980) ; County 
of Onondaga. 12 PERB 5[3035 (1979), conf#d. 77 A.D.2d 783, 13 PERB 
57011 (3d Dep't 1980). 
^CSEA. Inc. Local 1000. AFSCME v. Newman. 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB 
57011 (3d Dep't 1982), aff'd. 61 N.Y.2d 1001, 17 PERB f7007 
(1984). 
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the disposition of the District's affirmative defense to the 
charge. 
The contract's definition of workweek appears in a section 
captioned "CALL BACK AND OVERTIME". Even disregarding the 
Association's 'testimony regardingthe history of this clause7 
which the District argues we should not consider, it is clear 
that the workweek definition is only for purposes of computing 
overtime eligibility and payments. Lacking any evidence 
regarding a contrary intent, we cannot find that the language of 
the call back and overtime clause alone clearly and unmistakably 
applies to the scheduling of employees within the workweek as 
defined. Therefore, the call back and overtime clause is no more 
a source of waiver of the Association's right to bargain 
regarding the work schedule change than is the management rights 
clause. 
The District also argues in its exceptions that the 
Association has waived its bargaining rights based on its 
inaction in the face of notice from the District of an intent to 
change the work schedule. The record, however, clearly shows that 
the Association always expressed a right and interest in 
bargaining regarding the decision to change the schedules, which 
was met consistently by the District's denial of any obligation 
in that regard. If and to the extent the Association failed to 
come forward with "concrete bargaining proposals", as the 
District claims, that would, at best, subject it to a refusal to 
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bargain charge brought against it by the District. In rejecting 
the District's waiver defense, it is enough to find that the 
Association steadfastly asserted and preserved its right to 
bargain the decision to change the work schedules. 
In that latter regard,the District also argues that the 
decision to change the work schedules is not mandatorily 
negotiable under our decision in Starpoint Central School 
District.-7' In that case, we held that a change in an 
employee's work schedule from Monday through Friday, with 
overtime as necessary for weekend work, to a Wednesday through 
Sunday schedule, which eliminated the overtime opportunity, was 
mandatorily negotiable. Although we recognized in that case that 
the decision to work weekends was a managerial prerogative, we 
held that the selection of a specific means of accomplishing that 
prerogative, there the manipulation of work schedules, was 
mandatorily negotiable.-'' Here, as in Starpoint, the 
Association is seeking to bargain regarding the schedule by which 
weekend work is to be effected. Having unilaterally determined 
what the work schedules would be and who would work them, the 
District refused to negotiate the manner and means by which 
weekend coverage would be provided, contrary to its duty to 
bargain as defined in Starpoint. We find no material differences 
^23 PERB 53012 (1990). 
^Id. at 3027. 
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between this case and Starpoint and hold that the ALT properly 
applied it in his decision. 
The District's argument that it never refused to bargain is 
rejected because the violation pleaded and found is grounded upon 
the District' s unilateraT change in the work"" schedules;".""'" Even 
assuming that the parties met, and further assuming that the 
schedule change was the subject of negotiations during these 
meetings within the meaning of the Act, the District implemented 
the schedule change unilaterally before impasse was reached and 
without any compelling operational need to make that change. A 
party does not satisfy its statutory duty to bargain by 
negotiating on a subject for a time and then taking action 
unilaterally and prematurely regarding that subject. 
To remedy the District's refusal to negotiate, the ALJ 
ordered a restoration of the prior work schedule and payment to 
the affected employees of any monies lost as a result of the 
institution of the new schedule. This order is entirely 
consistent with the make-whole relief customarily ordered in 
unilateral change cases and does not require, as the District 
alleges, the payment of any monies except those lost through the 
schedule change. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are denied 
and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
/ 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Forthwith restore the custodial schedules to those 
which existed before the July 1, 1991 change, and pay 
unit employees any lost wages or benefits suffered as a 
result of the creation of the work schedule announced 
on July 1, 1991, including any overtime lost by virtue 
of the schedule changes, plus interest at the maximum 
legal rate; 
2. Post a notice in the form attached at all locations 
customarily used to post written communications to unit 
employees. 
DATED: December 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, ( auiine R. Chairperson 
xC 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member, 
S chme rt z, Member 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify
 a l l e m p l o y e e s in t n e u n j _ t represented by the Union-
Endicott Maintenance Workers Association that the Union-Endicott 
Central School District will: 
Forthwith restore the custodial schedules to 
those which existed before July 1, 1991 and pay 
unit employees any lost wages or benefits 
suffered as a result of the creation of the 
work schedule announced on July 1, 1991, 
including any overtime lost by virtue of the 
schedules, plus interest at the maximum legal 
rate. 
.Un ion- .End ico t t . C e n t r a l Schoo l • D i s t r i c t -
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
-This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOUTHERN TIER SUBSTITUTE TEACHERS, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3865 
WAVERLY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. : 
PAUL S. MAYO, for Petitioner 
R. WHITNEY MITCHELL, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Waverly 
Central School District (District) to a decision by the Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director). 
The Director declined to set aside an election in which the 
Southern Tier Substitute Teachers, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
(Petitioner) received a majority of the valid votes cast in a 
representation election. In finding the Petitioner eligible for 
certification as the exclusive bargaining agent for a unit of 
per-diem substitute teachers employed by the District, the 
Director rejected the District's argument that the election was 
not representative because only 2 0 of the 78 eligible employees 
voted-7 and, of those voting, only 12 voted in favor of 
-
7This is a 25.6% participation rate. 
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representation by the Petitioner. 
In its exceptions, the District argues that we should not 
certify any union as the majority representative for a unit 
unless it receives a majority of the valid votes cast in an 
election in which at least 3 0% of thei eligible voters have 
participated. The District finds support for a 3 0% election 
participation requirement in those sections of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules) requiring a showing of interest from at least 
30% of unit employees as a condition to the processing of a 
petition. 
Having considered the District's exceptions, we affirm the 
") Director's decision. 
We have always certified unions which have garnered a simple 
majority of the valid votes cast in an election. The District 
asks us to adopt a fundamentally different approach, one rejected 
by most other labor relations agencies.-7 In refusing to set 
aside this election, the Director adopted the National Labor 
Relations Board's (NLRB) decision in Lemco Construction, Inc.-7, 
which represents the prevailing view of public and private sector 
agencies throughout the country. We similarly subscribe to the 
rationale expressed in that decision, which is quoted in material 
-
7The Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor and the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey, however, each have a 3 0% 
election participation requirement. 
^124 LRRM 1329 (1987). Lemco involved an election in which only 
j one voter had participated. The representative character of a 
one-person vote had previously troubled the NLRB. 
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part in the Director's decision. Thus, absent evidence that 
employees were denied a reasonable opportunity to vote, a low 
voter turnout, by itself, offers no ground upon which to 
invalidate an election. We believe that this approach best 
recognizes and accommodates "t]^ ""TulidameTTiirar'"purp6ses~~of"'"a""'" 
representation election and the unit employees' right to refrain 
from voting, while best ensuring the speedy completion of 
representation proceedings in a manner which is entirely 
consistent with normal political processes. 
The District relies upon our showing of interest rules to 
support its argument that we should impose a 30% election 
participation requirement as a condition to certification. The 
showing of interest rules, however, are intended to establish a 
threshold of employee interest and therefore a reasonable 
potential for the ultimate establishment of majority status and 
to guard against the waste of agency resources.-7 An election 
participation rate below 30% does not mean that the union which 
wins the election is not the majority representative of the unit. 
It may merely mean that those employees who refrain from voting 
are content to be bound by the results obtained without their 
participation. Moreover, when, as here, there has been a 
reasonable opportunity to vote, there is no reason to suspect 
that the voting pattern, which resulted in a majority of the 
-See/ e.g. , Bd. of Educ. of the City of Yonkers, 10 PERB ^3100 
(1977) . 
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ballots being cast in favor of representation by the Petitioner, 
would not have prevailed in an election with more participants. 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny the District's 
exceptions and affirm the Director's decision. Accordingly, we 
have this date certified the Petitioner as the "'"exclusive 
bargaining agent for the unit stipulated to be appropriate. 
DATED: December 3 0, 1992 
Albany, New York 
2G~ 1 2 / 3 0 / 9 2 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, APSCME, APL-CIO, SUFFOLK 
LOCAL 852, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11895 
TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ 
and JANNA PFLU6ER of counsel), for Charging Party 
COOPER, SAPIR AND COHEN, P.C. (DAVID M. COHEN of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of 
Brookhaven (Town) and cross-exceptions filed by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Suffolk 
Local 852 (CSEA) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALT). The ALT held that the Town refused to reopen negotiations 
on a sick leave buy-back clause in the parties7 1989-91 
contracts-7 in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act). In finding a violation, the ALT 
reasoned that the Town had failed to fund the sick leave buy-back 
clause and that this funding failure amounted to the legislative 
J-'CSEA represents white-collar and blue-collar units in the Town 
which have separate collective bargaining agreements. 
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body's disapproval of that clause, which rendered that term of 
the contracts nonbinding.-7 The Town is under a continuing duty 
to bargain on demand mandatory subjects of negotiation, such as 
the item at issue, notwithstanding the existence of a contract, 
to the extent negotiations have not been foreclosed by agreement 
or otherwise waived. Therefore, the ALT held that the Town was 
statutorily obligated to reopen negotiations about a sick leave 
buy-out, or an alternative, pursuant to CSEA's demand. 
The Town excepts to the ALT's finding that it had a duty to 
reopen negotiations on the sick leave buy-back, arguing that 
there was no legislative disapproval of that term of the 
agreements. 
CSEA in its response to the Town's exceptions argues that 
the ALJ's controlling findings of fact and law are correct and 
that his decision finding the Town in violation of its duty to 
negotiate should be affirmed. If the ALJ's decision is reversed 
in this respect, CSEA argues in its cross-exceptions that the ALT 
erred by denying CSEA's motion to amend the charge to include an 
allegation that the Town refused to negotiate the sick leave buy-
-
7Act §201.12. The ALT's decision necessarily assumes that the 
sick leave buy-back required legislative approval. Our 
disposition of the charge makes it unnecessary for us to decide 
which terms of a contract are subject to legislative approval. 
See in this respect, however, Act §204-a.l, which refers to 
legislative approval being required as to any contract term 
"requiring legislative action to permit its implementation by 
amendment of law or by providing the additional funds 
therefor . . . ." 
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his earlier memorandum, Farber's testimony at the hearing 
establishes that the Town could have paid for a sick leave buy-
back from the general "employee benefits" portion of the budget 
or from appropriations made for other purposes. The rest of the 
record, including the legislative body's ratification of the 
entire contract, is simply inconsistent with a conclusion that 
the Town's legislative body either intended to or did in fact 
disapprove the sick leave buy-back provisions. Because the 
record does not support the finding that the Town's legislative 
body disapproved the contractual buy-back provisions, it must be 
concluded that there is no continuing duty to negotiate regarding 
them or an alternative to them.-'' 
Our reversal of the ALJ's decision finding the Town in 
violation of its duty to negotiate necessitates a consideration 
of CSEA's cross-exceptions. 
Without regard to the contested timeliness of CSEA's motion 
to amend, we find the motion to have been properly denied because 
the amendment, made at the end of the hearing, would have added a 
different cause of action against the Town than the one pleaded 
in the charge. The charge alleges only a refusal to renegotiate 
a mandatory subject of bargaining pursuant to demand, a per se 
violation of the Act if CSEA's allegations regarding legislative 
-'We express no opinion, of course, as to whether the Town's 
failure to buy back the sick leave on request violated the 
parties' contracts. That is an issue beyond our jurisdiction 
under §205.5(d) of the Act. 
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disapproval had been sustained. The Town's intent is immaterial 
under the charge as filed. In contrast, the amendment would have 
added a refusal to bargain allegation grounded entirely upon the 
Town's lack of good faith in entering into the sick leave buy-
back agreement under which only the Town's intent would be in 
issue. Except as both allegations arise under §2 09-a.l(d) of the 
Act, the original and the amended causes of actions are 
completely different in nature and required proof. The amendment 
proffered by CSEA at the end of the hearing would not merely have 
formalized an issue already before the parties. Rather, it would 
have injected a new issue into the proceeding at a late date. We 
have previously noted several times that amendments adding new 
causes of action are properly denied-/ and hold so here. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Town's exceptions are 
granted and the ALJ's decision is reversed. CSEA's cross-
exceptions are denied.-7 
-/See, e.g., State of New York (Dep't of Transportation), 23 PERB 
53005 (1990), conf'd, 174 A.D.2d 905, 24 PERB 57014 (3d Dep't 
1991); Service Employees Int'l Union. Local 222, 16 PERB 53063 
(1983); Public Employees Fed'n, 14 PERB 53036 (1981); Brookhaven-
Comsewoque Union Free School Dist., 9 PERB 53012 (1976). See 
also Kings Park Cent. School Dist., 7 PERB 54520 (1974). 
-/CSEA is no more advantaged if we were to characterize its 
amended cause of action as a contract repudiation. Under that 
theory, CSEA should have known of the alleged violation when 
Farber issued his memorandum in January 1990, making the 
proferred amendment plainly untimely. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
KAV^ ._,.f-y. W\&[jU 
Pau l ine R. K i n s e l l a , Chal rperson 
Walter L. E i senberg , Member 
E r i c J . /Schmertz, Member 
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back in good faith because it never had any intention to seek 
funding for that provision.-7 
Having reviewed the record and the parties' arguments, we 
reverse the ALJ's decision. 
CSEA had a statutory right to reopen negotiations regarding 
the sick leave buy-back only if it could establish that the 
agreement in that respect was not binding because it was 
legislatively disapproved. The purported evidence of legislative 
disapproval, and the only evidence relied upon by the AKT in 
finding a violation, is a memorandum from Frank Farber, Jr., the 
Town's Commissioner of Finance, denying requests for sick leave 
buy-backs for 1989 and 1990 because "there is no provision in the 
(1989) or (1990) budget to provide funds for this purpose." 
Whatever else the purpose of this memorandum may have been, 
the Commissioner of Finance is not the legislative body, nor does 
his memorandum evidence the legislative body's disapproval of 
this term of the agreement. A legislative body is not required 
to appropriate monies pursuant to a particular line item in a 
budget. Indeed, the ALT specifically found that the Town "does 
not make line item budget provisions." Therefore, the absence of 
a specific buy-back provision in the Town's budget does not 
evidence a legislative disapproval. Moreover, notwithstanding 
-'See, e.g. , City of Newburgh, 24 PERB f3022 (1991) . 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PHYLLIS A. SMITH, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13217 
BALLSTON SPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION and 
BALLSTON SPA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondents. 
PHYLLIS A. SMITH, pro se 
RUBERTI, GIRVIN and FERLAZZO, P.C. (JAMES E. GIRVIN 
of counsel), for Respondent Ballston Spa Central School 
District 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Phyllis A. 
Smith to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director). Smith alleges that the 
Ballston Spa Education Association (BSEA) violated 
§209-a.2(a), (b) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) and that the Ballston Spa Central School District 
(District) violated §209-a.l(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) of the 
Act. The gravamen of her charge is that the District and BSEA 
entered into a collective bargaining agreement which bases 
teachers' salaries, in part, on earned0credit hours in violation 
of the Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1991 (ADA). 
Smith alleges that the agreement discriminates against her 
Board - U-13217 -2 
because she earns less than her "peers" simply because they have 
earned more credit hours than she, who is otherwise qualified for 
her job. 
The Director dismissed the charge as deficient without a 
hearing on several grounds• He found that we have ho 
jurisdiction over alleged violations of other statutes, that 
Smith lacks standing to allege a refusal to bargain or a failure 
to continue expired contract terms, and that there was no 
evidence of improper motivation in the negotiation or application 
of the contract's terms, which themselves did not violate the Act 
in any respect. 
It does not appear that the exceptions were served upon the 
parties as required by §204.10(c) of our Rules of Procedure. The 
District has raised this service failure in response to Smith's 
exceptions. Dismissal of the exceptions is, therefore, required 
on this basis.-7 We note, moreover, that, even if properly 
served, the exceptions would necessarily have been denied on 
their merits. The entirety of the exceptions are directed to the 
BSEA's and the District's alleged noncompliance with the federal 
ADA. As the Director correctly held, our jurisdiction does not 
extend to the investigation, adjudication or remedy of alleged 
violations of the ADA. 
^United Fed'n of Teachers (Costabile) , 25 PERB ^3034 (1992) ; 
United Fed'n of Teachers (Thomas) , 15 PERB J[3030 (1982) . 
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For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are 
dismissed and the Director's decision is affirmed. 
DATED: December 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
^\ r-v v.~x ^ ylLrfS.vi k Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
UZ^C 
Eric J< Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROGER E. TOUSSAINT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11103 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
ROGER E. TOUSSAINT, pro se 
ALBERT C. COSENZA, GENERAL COUNSEL (DANIEL TOPPER 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Roger E. 
Toussaint to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 
After a four-day hearing,-'' the ALJ dismissed Toussaint's charge 
against the New York City Transit Authority (Authority) which 
alleges that the Authority violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it filed 
disciplinary charges against him, allegedly because he had filed 
grievances against the Authority. 
Discrediting Toussaint's testimony to the limited extent it 
differed from the Authority's, the ALJ found that the record did 
1 1 W « ^ & 1 1 W V 1~J.11A t_ J. \J KJL. & & d _|_ J. 1 t - W U O U ± D U X p ± J . 1 1 C U J s S ^ W C L U . O C 1 X ^ i .J.&'wl J_ -L,-L, ^ VA 
^Toussaint was then represented by counsel for the Amalgamated 
Transit Union, his bargaining agent. Toussaint has since assumed 
personal responsibility for this appeal. 
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grievances or had otherwise complained about actions taken by the 
Authority's management or supervisors. The ALT held that the 
Authority had good cause to bring disciplinary charges against 
Toussaint for his arguably insubordinate actions involving 
recurringfallures or refusals to followhis supervisor's orders. 
In his exceptions, Toussaint argues that the ALT's decision 
is inconsistent with arbitration awards which found him not 
guilty of certain of the insubordination charges. He argues that 
these awards bind us in this proceeding and necessitate a 
reversal of the ALT's decision. Toussaint also argues that the 
ALJ erred by receiving a letter from the Authority regarding the 
res judicata and collateral estoppel effects of the arbitration 
awards which was filed after it had filed its post-hearing brief 
with the ALJ. Toussaint otherwise argues generally that the 
ALT's decision is not supported by the record. 
The Authority argues that the ALT's decision is correct in 
all material respects and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the ALT's decision. 
The arbitration panel's dismissal of certain of the 
disciplinary charges-7 is not dispositive as a matter of fact or 
law of the Authority's motivation for bringing them, the only 
issue which must be decided in the context of this particular 
-'Two of the charges were dismissed; the third, relating to 
Toussaint's wearing of a safety helmet, was sustained, although 
the requested penalty of dismissal was reduced by the arbitration 
panel to a warning. 
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improper practice charge. In that respect, the ALJ determined on 
review of the evidence, including a demeanor-based credibility 
resolution which we have no reason to disturb, that the 
Authority's disciplinary charges were not motivated by the 
"grievances of compTaihts Tbussaiht had filed. Rather, the ALT 
concluded that Toussaint filed grievances to give himself an 
opportunity to claim improper retaliation when the disciplinary 
charges, which he believed would be brought against him for job-
related misconduct, were actually instituted by the Authority. 
In reaching these conclusions, the ALJ rejected any inference 
that the Authority disciplined Toussaint after he had grieved to 
dissuade him from filing other grievances.-7 Having reviewed 
the record, we find that it fully supports the ALJ's 
determination. 
We also deny Toussaint's remaining exception regarding the 
Authority's filing of a letter with the ALJ after the filing of 
its memorandum of law.-7 The letter was not solicited by the 
ALJ, and there is no indication that it was made part of the 
record, that Toussaint was denied an opportunity to reply to it 
or that the ALJ relied upon it in reaching her decision. Therefore, 
-''Contrary to Toussaint's claim, the ALJ did not find that the 
Authority's disciplinary charges against him had merit nor did 
the ALJ reassess Toussaint's guilt or innocence on the 
disciplinary charges. 
-
7The letter simply transmitted a copy of another ALJ's ruling in 
other charges involving Toussaint and the Authority regarding the 
res judicata and collateral estoppel effects of arbitration 
awards in our administrative proceedings. 
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the AU's mere receipt of the letter was not prejudicial to 
Toussaint and we, therefore, deny this exception. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are denied 
and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE,ORDERED that the charge mu^t be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
UX^K f~rlT,r^\\o 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric Jy/Schmertz, Member Jjy 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE INSPECTION, SECURITY AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, DISTRICT 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12379 
STATE OF NEW YORK (GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF 
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS), 
Respondent. 
ROWLEY, FORREST, O'DONNELL & HITE P.C. 
(RICHARD R. ROWLEY and KEVIN S. CASEY of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
A WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD W. MCDOWELL 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York 
State Inspection, Security and Law Enforcement Employees, 
District Council 82, American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (Council 82) to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) dismissing, after hearing, Council 82's charge against 
the State of New York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations) 
(State). The charge alleges that the State violated §209-a.l(a) 
and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it failed to tell Council 82, pursuant to its several inquiries 
during negotiations, whether it would pay the performance and 
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longevity increments in the parties' 1988-91 contract if a 
successor agreement was not reached before the 1988-91 contract 
expired on March 31, 1991. The State's repeated response to 
Council 82's inquiries was that the matter was under review and 
it did notthen know whichprovisions of the 1988-91 agreement 
would be continued post-expiration. Finding no persuasive 
evidence that the State's responses were untrue, the Director 
dismissed the charge. 
In its exceptions, Council 82 argues that proof of falsity-
is immaterial because the State had a duty to make a 
determination within a reasonable time of its receipt of Council 
82's inquiries as to whether or not it would pay the increments. 
To whatever extent falsity of the State's response is material, 
Council 82 argues that it satisfied its burden of proof. 
The State argues that it had no duty until the contract 
expired to decide which terms, if any, of the 1988-91 contract 
would be continued if there were no successor in place and that 
it gave an honest response to each of Council 82's several 
inquiries. 
Having read the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, including those at oral argument, we affirm the 
Director's decision. 
Council 82 was not seeking information from the State of the 
type which most often forms the basis for information-related 
improper practice charges. Usually these charges concern an 
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unsatisfied demand for documents or objective data. Nonetheless, 
we have held that an employer's general duty to provide 
information-7 encompasses a duty to give a response to an 
inquiry if a response is reasonably relevant and necessary to 
coht r a c t hego t iation or adm in i s t r a t i on. -1 in th i s case, the 
State responded to Council 82's inquiries. If we were to accept 
Council 82's primary argument and require not only a response to 
its inquiries but a determination on them, it would be tantamount 
to requiring the development and disclosure of information which 
does not then exist. We have never interpreted the duty to 
provide information so broadly and we are not persuaded that 
there is good reason here to do so. 
On the other hand, to deliberately mislead a party 
in response to its specific inquiry is no more consistent 
with the concept of good faith bargaining than would be the 
fabrication and distribution of false information. Therefore, 
we agree with the Director that the pertinent inquiry 
in this case is whether, in fact, the State had made a decision 
at the date of any of Council 82's inquiries as to whether it 
would continue the performance and longevity increments after 
-/See, e.cr. , Bd. of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of 
Albany. 6 PERB [^3 012 (1973) . 
g/Villacre of Johnson City, 12 PERB f3020 (1979) (duty to advise 
as to whether employer would accept an arbitration award). The 
State in this case also disputes Council 82's need for the 
response it sought. Our disposition of this charge makes it 
unnecessary to consider that argument. 
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expiration of the 1988-91 contract. In that respect, we find, as 
did the Director, that there is insufficient evidence that a 
decision had been made at the dates of Council 82 's inquiries. 
For the reasons set forth above, Council 82's exceptions are 
deniedandthe Directdf7s decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, JTCIU.-L -LUC ts.» x> 
£w £ r 
Chairperson 
v 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J/. Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
J PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, LOCAL 4053, 
SEIU/AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE No. u-12557 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE INSURANCE FUND), 
Respondent. 
JOHN J. CULKIN, pro se 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL 
(REBECCA L. CAUDLE of counsel), for Respondent 
) BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by John J. Culkin 
to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge. The improper 
practice charge in issue was filed by the Public Employees 
Federation, Local 4053, SEIU/AFT, AFL-CIO against the State of 
New York (State Insurance Fund) (State). PEF alleges that the 
State interfered with and discriminated against Culkin in 
violation of §2 09-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when its agent referenced Culkin's union 
activities in a cover letter transmitting Culkin's application 
for appointment to the position of Executive Director of the 
State Insurance Fund (Fund). The ALT held that the reference to 
Culkin's union activities was improper and she ordered any 
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references in that respect redacted from the letter. The ALT 
found, however, that Cecilia Norat, then the Fund's Deputy-
Executive Director, had been effectively appointed to the 
Executive Director's position before Culkin had applied for that 
"position". Therefore, the ALT held that the State's reference to 
Culkin's union activities did not taint the selection process or 
prejudice Culkin's opportunity for appointment to the Executive 
Director's position. 
To the extent Culkin's exceptions are directed to the 
allegations in the charge,-7 he argues only that the ALJ erred 
in concluding that Norat would have been appointed despite the 
State's references to his union activities which accompanied his 
application for the Executive Director's position. 
In response, the State argues that Culkin merely repeats the 
arguments which were made below to the ALJ. The State submits 
that the ALJ's findings of fact and law are correct and that her 
decision should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments, we 
deny the exceptions and affirm the ALJ's decision. 
-^Culkin, for example, questions the State's motivation for 
bringing certain disciplinary actions against him and for the 
Inspector General's investigation of him. The charge as filed, 
however, does not allege any impropriety in these respects. 
Culkin also alleges that the State is not complying with the 
posting order, but that is properly the subject of a compliance 
review, not exceptions. 
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Culkin is not a party to this charge,-' only its intended 
beneficiary and the person who would most immediately benefit 
from a remedy if a violation of the Act were found to have been 
committed. Under our Rules, exceptions may be filed only by a 
party.-' PEF, hot Culkin, is; the charging pa^ r^ y and it was 
PEF's right to file exceptions, not Culkin's, which PEF has not 
done. To treat Culkin as a party without his having obtained 
that status would not only ignore the plain language of our 
Rules, it would also confuse and disrupt the prosecution, 
settlement, withdrawal and administrative and judicial appeal of 
our proceedings generally. As Culkin has no standing to file 
these exceptions, they are not properly before us and we reject 
them on that basis. 
We would affirm the AKT's decision, however, even if we were 
to consider the exceptions on their merits. We find no reason 
from our review of the exceptions and the record to disturb the 
AKT's basic conclusion that PEF had not proven that the reference 
to Culkin's union activities affected the appointment of the 
Fund's Executive Director or his chances for appointment to that 
position. 
-'A party is defined in relevant part in §200.5 of our Rules of Pro= 
cedure (Rules) as the "person" or "organization" "filing a charge", 
or "named as a party in a charge" or "whose timely motion to 
intervene...has been granted". Culkin did not file this charge, he 
is not named as a charging party and he did not move to intervene. 
5/Rules of Procedure, §2 04.10. 
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For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are rejected 
and the ALJ's decision and order is affirmed. 
DATED: December 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
d\^Ayr~A VWWK 
Pauline R. Kinsel la , Chairperson 
r al te r L. Eisenberg, Membe^ Wal
Eric J3< Schmertz, Member^ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA/ 
GRADUATE STUDENT EMPLOYEES UNION, 
AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2894 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY 
OF NEW YORK), 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board,-7 and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Communications Workers of 
America/Graduate Student Employees Union, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
y Upon inquiry of the parties, we have been advised, and are 
persuaded, that there is no impediment to the issuance of 
this Order at this time. See 20 PERB 54063, at 4082 n.l 
(1987). 
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for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Graduate students holding State-funded 
positions as graduate assistants or teaching 
assistants. 
Excluded:All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Communications Workers of 
America/Graduate Student Employees Union, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
|Uv^,^(\ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
z^Y. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 




WAVERLY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Southern Tier Substitute 
Teachers, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, 
in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All per diem substitute teachers who have 
received a reasonable assurance of continuing 
employment as referenced in Civil Service Law 
§201.7(d). 
CASE NO. C-3865 
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Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Southern Tier Substitute 
Teachers, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively ineludes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: December 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ALFRED S. LEONE, 
Petitioners, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3986 
TOWN OF GATES, 
Employer, 
-and-
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
LOCAL NO. 118, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Local No. 118 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-3986 
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Unit: Included: All regular full-time laborers, mechanical 
equipment operators, mechanics and working 
foremen in the Employer's Highway Department. 
Excluded: Superintendent of Highways, Seasonal and all 
other employees of the Employer. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, Local No. 118. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: December 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
u&A v ^ gbJL, 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
LAJLJbbz^ 2!. 
L. Eisenberg, Memb 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
J PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 2 94, IBT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
and CASE NO. C-3988 
COUNTY OF ALBANY AND ALBANY COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 294, IBT, 
AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Full-time investigators and senior 
investigators. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Certification - C-3988 
- 2 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 294, IBT, 
AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
j^^iwW. 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 




STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HOURLY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OP THE CITY 
OF LACKAWANNA, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4001 
i 
CITY OF LACKAWANNA, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, DPW UNIT, LOCAL 815, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, DPW Unit, Local 815 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
Certification - C-4 001 2 -
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Chief Mechanic (salary), Welder, Auto Mechanic 
& Auto Body Repairman, Heavy Equipment 
Operator, Maintainer, Signal Maintenance Man 
(Salary), Sanitation Division - Driver (MEO), 
Motor Equipment Operator, Janitor, Sanitation 
Man (Laborer), Laborer & Watchman, Recreation 
Laborer, Sign Painter (Salary)7 Timekeeper 
(Salary). 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, DPW Unit, Local 815. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella,C hairperson 
Walter^L. Eisenberg, Member V 
Eric Schmertz, Member 
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N E W YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
8 0 W O L F ROAD J O H N M - C R O T T Y 
A L B A N Y , N E W YORK 12205
 DEPOTY CHJklRMAN 
(518) 457-2614
 ANO 
C O U N S E L 
M E M O R A N D U M 
November 2 3 , 1992 
TO: B o a r d 
FROM: John M. CrottyQ"£/"?^-— 
RE: - Amendment to §2-04.1(d) of Rules of Procedure 
Amend §204.1(d) as follows: 
. . . The charge may be withdrawn by the charging party 
before the issuance of [a final] the dispositive decision 
and recommended order based thereon upon approval by the 
director. Thereafter, the charge may be withdrawn only 
with the approval of the board. Whenever the director or 
the board, as the case may be, approves the withdrawal of 
the charge, the case will be closed. 
(Material in brackets to be deleted. New material is 
underlined.) 
The amendment to §204.1(d) conforms to the current §201.2(c) 
regarding the withdrawal of representation petitions. The 
amendment will permit the necessary flexibility in considering 
whether to approve a withdrawal request and preserve the distinct 
roles of the Director and the Board at different stages of a 
proceeding. 
JC:pn 
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N E W YORK S T A T E {TQ V \\ 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD ^ 
„ „ , , , „ J O H N M. C R O T T Y 
8 0 W O L F ROAD 
A L B A N Y , N E W YORK 12205 DEPUTY CHAIRMAN 
( 5 1 8 ) 4 5 7 - 2 6 1 4 AND 
COUNSEL 
M E M O R A N D U M 
December 1, 1992 
TO: The Board 
FROM: John M. 
RE: Rule Changes 
The following changes in the Rules are Proposed. 
Delete §201.5(a)(4) requiring a petitioner to state whether 
it wants exclusive representation. The Act now makes the 
majority representative of a unit the exclusive bargaining agent 
for that unit as of right. Subparagraphs 5-11 would be 
renumbered accordingly. 
Delete §201.5(b)(3) requiring a challenging labor union to 
state whether an incumbent is the exclusive representative. 
Subparagraphs 4-10 would be renumbered accordingly. Rationale is 
the same as above. 
Amend §§207.4(b)(9), 208.2(b) and (c) and 209.2(a) and (b) 
to substitute "80 Wolf Road" for "50 Wolf Road". 
Amend §208.2(c) to delete "without charge". Copies of 
existing documents are no longer distributed free of charge. 
Amend §208.2(d) to delete the following introductory 
proviso: "Except as provided in subdivision (c) of this 
section,". This amendment is made necessary by the proposed 
deletion of "without charge" from §208.2(c). The exception 
referenced by current §208.2(d) would no longer apply with the 
adoption of the proposed amendment to §208.2(c). 
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NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
„_ . . . „ JOHNM.CROTTY 
80 WOLF ROAD 
ALBANY, NEW YORK 12205 DEPUTY CHAIRMAN 
(518)457-2614 AND 
C O U N S E L 
M E M O R & N D U M 
D e c e m b e r 1 7 , 1992 
The B o a r d 
John M. Crotty £\"KC-
Rule Change ^ 
The following amendment to §200.10 is proposed. 
200.10 Piling; service. (a) The term 
"filing", as used in this Chapter, shall mean 
delivery to the board or an agent thereof, or 
the act of mailing to the board\. "1 , or 
deposit of the papers enclosed in a properly 
addressed wrapper into the custody of an 
overnight delivery service for overnight 
delivery, prior to the latest time designated 
by the overnight delivery service for 
overnight delivery. 
(b) The term "service", as used in this 
Chapter, shall mean delivery to a party or 
the act of mailing to a party[.], or deposit 
of the papers enclosed in a properly 
addressed wrapper into the custody of an 
overnight delivery service for overnight 
delivery, prior to the latest time designated 
by the overnight delivery service for 
overnight delivery. 
r Z If (O "uvernigm: aeiivery service" means any 
delivery service which regularly accepts 
items for overnight delivery to any address 
in the state. 
• % P»nted on recycled paper 
